

Collective Memories of Germans and Japanese About the Past Half-century

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We investigate the collective memories of two samples drawn in 1991, one from the former West Germany and one from Yokohama, Japan. In the early 1990s such samples included many members of World War II cohorts and also cohorts born long after that war had ended. We consider the relation of age, conceptualised as birth cohort, to the salience of memories of national and world events that were mentioned as important in response to a quite general open-ended question about the past half-century. The relations are similar across the two countries in so far as external events like World War II might have had similar impacts on each population, while each country is distinctive with regard to events that especially impinged upon it. Hypotheses about the importance of adolescence and early adulthood to the imprinting of memories are generally confirmed, but several types of evidence suggest the need to extend the delimiting ages to earlier than the mid-teens and later than the mid-twenties. Other evidence indicates the desirability of distinguishing between recent events that are the focus of media attention and earlier events that depend more fully on autobiographical memory.

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In addition, we consider special types of memories, such as the extent to which Germans mention the annihilation of Jews during World War II and Japanese mention the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Neither event appears often in collective memories of the war, but instead personal suffering as a result of the war's impact on one's own life is especially prominent in the memories of World War II cohorts. This finding points up the difference between what observers characterise as "collective memory" and what sample surveys indicate are the actual memories of the general public.

INTRODUCTION

Germany and Japan share a unique history: allies during World War II, despite racial beliefs that in each case might have excluded the other; initial success of an extraordinary nature in the early months of the war, followed by total defeat and occupation by their enemies; subsequent creation of democratic constitutional regimes, heavily influenced by the ideologies of these former enemies; and finally, phoenix-like emergence from post-war shambles into economic powerhouses, though still constrained politically and militarily by their previous war-time histories.

There are also large differences between the two countries, not only culturally but even in relation to World War II. In particular, as Buruma (1994) emphasises, German and Japanese perspectives on World War II have been influenced by two very different war-time events with long-lasting reverberations. For Germans, the deliberate and systematic annihilation of Jews in large parts of Europe created a "collective memory" of having been victimisers that is difficult to overcome and which leads to repeated admonishment to do "the labour of mourning" ("*Trauerarbeit*", Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1975). For Japanese, on the other hand, the dominant collective memory is often said to be of themselves as victims of the first use of the atomic bomb: "To the majority of Japanese, Hiroshima is the supreme symbol of the Pacific War" (Buruma, 1994, p.92). One contrast that Buruma considers but appears to reject is that of enduring differences in national character, for example, Benedict's (1946) distinction between "guilt" and "shame" cultures—the former applying more to Germany and the latter to Japan, so that public confession would be encouraged by Germans but avoided by Japanese.

Both the similarities and the differences of the two peoples make a comparison of their salient memories of considerable interest today when each population still includes substantial proportions that experienced the events of World War II at different ages and also substantial proportions born well after the end of the war. Accounts such as Buruma's (1994) draw mainly on conversations with political and intellectual figures, plus observations based on films, books, and other cultural objects. How well they reflect the collective memories of the larger public in each country is impossible to tell. For this purpose, sample survey data are essential.

We use the term “collective memories” in the plural, as distinct from the singular form that dates from Halbwachs (1950/1980) and is common today in social science writing. The plural “memories” indicates that our research elicits the memories of samples of individuals, whereas most studies of collective memory are concerned with how “objects” of memory are represented in some collective form, as in statues, language, films, or other symbols (e.g. Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997; Schudson, 1992; Schwartz, 1982). At the same time, retention of the word “collective” reflects our continued focus on national collectivities by the questions we ask and the theoretical population we attempt to represent for each country. In this way our research remains connected to social science writing that deals with “group, institutional, and cultural recollections of the past...” (Schudson, 1992, p.3; see also Schwartz, 1982.)

THEORETICAL ISSUES

Our research was initially guided by past work that emphasised the significance of adolescence and early adulthood as an important locus of memories generally, including individual memories of national and world events. In sociology the major impetus for this perspective on the life course was first developed by Karl Mannheim (1928/1952, p.291) with regard to “modes of behavior, feelings, and thought”. A systematic effort to test Mannheim’s ideas as they might apply specifically to memories was made by Schuman and Scott (1989) using a US national sample, and there is also earlier related work by Roberts and Lang (1985). In psychology the importance of these same years for memory was developed independently by Rubin, Wetzler, and Nebes (1986) and Fitzgerald (1988). We attempt to replicate these past findings in Germany and Japan, and to do so with considerable precision at several points with regard to the connection of a specific cohort to a particular event, noting also how the critical age from which a memory originates can vary depending on the nature of the event.

Second, we assess the degree to which a collective memory such as the Holocaust or Hiroshima that has been attributed to virtually a whole society is actually salient in the memories reported by representative samples of these same societies. This will also raise a related issue: the connection between characterisations of a past event through media accounts, commemorations, or other cultural constructions and the extent to which ordinary people adopt the same characterisation.

Third, we explore the forces that distinguish memories of earlier events from memories of very recent events. Specifically, we hypothesise that memories of early national events are likely to depend more heavily on personal experience, whereas memories of recent national events can be due largely to an emphasis by the media on what is happening “now”. This also corresponds approximately to the difference between episodic or autobiographical memory and semantic or factual memory. Personal experience and media emphasis are certainly not mutually exclusive—a recent event emphasised by the media can also have wide

autobiographical impact—but we believe that the balance of the two forces in creating memories is likely to vary between earlier and recent events.¹

THE DATA FROM JAPAN AND GERMANY

The German and Japanese surveys we draw on were undertaken separately and there were enough differences between them to require caution in direct comparison. (The differences occurred because our questions were added to larger surveys directed by others, and had to be adapted to the exigencies of those surveys and to the populations under study.) Therefore, we report the initial results of each investigation separately in its own terms. However, there are fundamental similarities in both the overall structure of the two investigations and in their results, so at points along the way and more fully after presenting the findings for each country, we discuss both similarities and differences between the two countries and draw conclusions about collective memories more generally.

The Events Questions

Both surveys started from the open-ended question used in 1985 by Schuman and Scott (1989, p.363) to study American memories of the past half-century:

There have been a lot of national and world events and changes over the past 50 years—say, from about 1930 right up until today. Would you mention one or two such events or changes that seem to you to have been especially important. There aren't any right or wrong answers to the question—just whatever national or world events or changes over the past 50 years that come to mind as important to you.²

¹ Here we follow Tulving (1972, 1983) in treating episodic and autobiographical memory as essentially the same. Conway (1990) points out that factual knowledge about one's self (e.g. knowing one's date of birth) can be considered a form of autobiographical memory, but for the purpose of the present article the important distinction is between knowledge remembered in terms of personal experience and knowledge in the form of learned information not tied to memories of personal experience in a particular time and place. Weidenfeld and Lutz (1994) distinguish "experiential" from "acquired" attitudes, a somewhat similar distinction in this context to episodic versus semantic.

² As is evident from the wording, the time period was not intended to be exactly 50 years, because in 1985 that would have made 1935 the precise starting point, whereas the benchmark of "about" 1930" was also included in the question. The authors had wished to allow respondents to include memorable events from the early 1930s (especially the Depression and related political happenings) without worrying about the exact starting year.

Note also that the wording of the question is intended to allow, but not require, respondents to choose events that had a directly personal impact. A later split-sample experiment was carried out in the United States to determine whether omitting the possibly personalising words "to you" at the end of the main question would affect the kind of events chosen (Schuman & Rieger, 1996). Of 26 events mentioned, only two showed a significant difference between experimental forms ($P < .05$, based on N s of 455 and 459), both events being infrequent in choice overall, and no event showed a significant age by form interaction. The experiment suggests that the basic question formulation is robust, not changed importantly by minor differences in wording.

[If only one mention ask] Is there any other national or world event or change over the past 50 years that you feel was especially important?

[After events are named:] What was it about ... that makes it seem especially important to you?

The request to name important events and changes may appear at first to ask for judgements, rather than memories. However, the question taps memories in the sense of what is most salient or accessible to respondents, what “comes to mind” most readily when they try to recall public events of the past half-century without any guidance other than the subjective word “important”. Evidence from past research with the same question points to the importance of memory to the task (Schuman & Scott, 1989) and is consistent with other evidence about what is memorable in personal lives (Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1996). Further evidence will be presented here.³

When the question was adapted for the German survey in 1991, the 50-year period was updated and stated to be from “about 1940”. Taken literally this would eliminate the early years of Nazi rule, although it includes almost the entire World War II period, as well as the systematic effort to annihilate the Jews. However, as in the earlier US study, the word “about” (German: “*etwa*”) before 1940 allowed respondents freedom to reach back into the 1930s and several referred to Hitler’s accession to power in 1933. The full German wording is given in the Appendix.⁴

A different problem presented itself when the original English question was adapted for the Japanese survey. The chronology used in the West is not so well known in Japan, and instead it was necessary to refer to “the beginning of the Showa Era”, the start of the reign of Emperor Hirohito [literally 1926], in describing the period to be considered. This placed the formal starting point back even earlier than 1930 but, as will become evident, few if any respondents referred to the pre-World War II period. The original Japanese question is also included in the Appendix, and back translations into English show high consistency with the original.

³ When a comprehensive list of events such as World War II was presented to a sample of Americans, their choices of which were most important no longer showed the relations to cohort described later here (unpublished data). In this case, only judgement was involved, not memory.

⁴ Two problems occurred with the German translation. First, the follow-up “Why” question omitted the German for the word “seems” and may emphasise more than the original English a purely personal explanation for choosing an event. It is possible that this increased the proportion of personal explanations, but the experiment reported in footnote 2 provides some reassurance on this point, as does the fact that a great many Germans gave impersonal explanations for choosing many events (see later mention of the large difference between personal explanations for World War II and for Reunification). A second difference between the German and original American questions is that the “why” question was asked before the interviewer had tried to obtain a second event when only one had been given spontaneously. It is doubtful that this had any substantive effect, but it may have affected the proportion of people who gave at least two events.

In making comparisons between German and Japanese responses (or between either and earlier research on the United States), we have kept in mind the differences in the start date given to respondents, but the practical effect of this will be seen to be negligible. The ending date of “today” given in the two countries was almost identical, as both surveys were carried out in early 1991: the Japanese survey ran from December, 1990, into February, 1991; the German survey from January, 1991, into March, 1991.⁵

Sampling Considerations

The German data were gathered as part of a face-to-face survey of West Germany (FRG) by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach. The sample employed quotas for location (by state and size of community), age, gender, employment status, and occupation, an approach Allensbach has used successfully for a number of years. No response rate is possible for this quota-type sample. However, we compared the sample results against census data for 1991 for age, gender, education, and state of residence, and the correspondence was nearly perfect by age, gender, and state, and with some overinclusion by several percentage points of the university educated and underinclusion of the least educated—a common outcome of almost all cross-section surveys. Our final German sample size is 728, after omitting a small number of cases (24) with missing data on the Events question.⁶ We should emphasise that we make no attempt to generalise our results to what was formerly East Germany (GDR), which had a quite different post-war history from West Germany (see, for example, Weidenfeld & Lutz, 1994).

The Japanese sample that provided substantive responses to our questions consists of 843 respondents drawn from the Greater Yokohama area.⁷ The

⁵ One other difference between the German and Japanese questions was in questionnaire location. Our collective memories questions in the German survey came at almost the beginning, as was most desirable. The collective memories questions in the Japanese survey came at the very end of the interview, but the rest of that survey dealt with matters entirely unrelated to memories of the past, primarily issues of social relations and mental health. The main disadvantage of having our questions at the end of what was a long interview consisting of a great many closed questions, was that many respondents were tired and simply said “don’t know” to our open-ended questions, as noted later.

⁶ Because of limitations of resources we had not employed the full original German sample ($N=2016$), but drew from it randomly an approximate 40% subsample to use for all translation, coding, and analysis. We also omitted completely the small number of respondents ($n=21$) less than 18 years of age, both to allow for the more useful control of education and to make the findings comparable to previous published analyses with American data. (Cases missing on some other, but not all, variables remain in the sample, but when the events question is cross-tabulated with age, the sample size becomes 706.)

⁷ Yokohama city itself had an estimated population in 1994 of 3.3 million, not counting surrounding towns. We have again omitted from our sample all respondents under 18 years of age and also omitted a special supplementary sample of mothers, who are not part of our target population.

Japanese sample had been constructed using disproportionate stratified probability sampling within age/gender categories in order to increase representation from older age groups. Deviations from the national population by gender were slight, but the sample is overweighted at the older age end (60 and above). This does not bias our primary interest in associations with age itself, and has the advantage of increasing the stability of results for older adults when showing percentages by age. However, where we present univariate results intended to provide approximate representation of the Japanese national population, we have reweighted the data to reflect the age distribution for the entire country, as shown later in Table 2.

Japan is a highly homogeneous country, and this homogeneity also applied to its experience during World War II and much subsequent history. The Greater Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area alone constitutes approximately a quarter of the total Japanese population (Japan Statistical Association, 1997), and our results are quite likely also generalisable to much of urban Japan, which in 1995 was said to make up 78% of the total population (*United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, 1995, Table 9). In addition, none of the relations we found for our German sample differed significantly between large cities, small cities, and rural areas, and it may be that the same would hold for Japan if such an analysis could be carried out.⁸

Coding, Classification, and Analysis

For both the German and Japanese data, responses were first translated into English and then coded, using categories derived from a preliminary review of a sample of answers in each country. Coding was generally straightforward, and reliability checks for the main events yielded agreement of more than 90% between independent coders.

Our major independent variable is age, as we are especially interested in the effects of life experiences over the past half-century. We have transformed age into 13 categories, each a five-year span except at the beginning (18–24) and end (80 & over) of the age distribution, and we use these to plot the memories for each population, thus allowing graphically for non-linearity. We assume that

⁸The estimated response rate for the total Japanese sample was 72%. However, the full sample for the Japanese project included 509 respondents who did not answer our questions—that is, they show up simply as missing data on our questions and in most cases interviewers indicated that they answered “don’t know”. As we also noted that some interviewer/PSUs had higher response rates than others, we repeated the main results for the %Mentions column in Table 2 for only those PSUs with response rates above 70%. The new results differ by less than 2% from those in the table, which strongly indicates that the non-response can be treated as essentially random error. It is also likely that the smaller number of Japanese mentions of second events than the German sample is due to the same reason: more reluctance on the part of both respondents and interviewers to try to obtain a second event. (Schuman & Scott, 1989, report that their US samples also had a high proportion of respondents (33%) giving only one event.)

virtually all of the age effects reported here are due to cohort experience, not to the ageing process as such.⁹ In addition to age, we have taken into account possible effects due to gender, education, and, for Germany, urban–rural location.¹⁰ The main other variables used are based on the content of the reported memories and will be developed as we proceed.

RESULTS

Collective Memories in West Germany in 1991

The events mentioned most often by Germans are presented in Table 1, which includes all events given by at least 3% of the sample and also indicates the approximate date at which each event occurred. The percentages giving each event as 1st mention or 2nd mention are shown in the table, with the percentages adding to 100 for each column. More important for most of our analysis, the percentage of the total *N* (728) that gave an event (regardless of whether mentioned 1st or 2nd) is provided in the next column. For example, 50.7% of the German respondents gave Reunification as either their 1st or 2nd mention, which implies that 49.3% of those giving any event did not mention Reunification at all.

Two categories dominate the German responses: World War II and Reunification, with the former more frequent for first mentions and the latter much more so for second mentions and also for %Mentions overall. As most respondents gave two different events, they were not forced to choose between World War II and Reunification. Yet of those who gave two events, one of which was either World War II or Reunification, only 15% mentioned both. The rest mentioned one of the other six events listed in Table 1, or gave an infrequent event coded as “Other” (e.g. seven respondents in the total sample mentioned as especially important a soccer championship game).

Relations to Cohort. We examined the associations of each of the six events to cohort (represented by age in 1991), with education, gender, and

⁹ There is accumulating evidence that, except at extreme old age, the ageing process among adults does not produce particular effects such as an increasingly conservative outlook. (See Davis, 1992; Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Tyler & Schuller, 1991.)

¹⁰ Age was already precoded into categories in the German data we received, and we then matched those categories in dividing the Japanese data into age groups. The resulting age categories are quite close to those used by Schuman and Scott (1989). For those who prefer cohort birth dates, the X-axis labels in our figures would read: born before 1912, 1912–1916, 1917–21, 1922–26, 1927–31, 1932–36, 1937–41, 1942–46, 1947–51, 1952–56, 1957–61, 1962–66, 1967–73. Note that the Japanese sample is older on average than the German sample, primarily because of the oversampling noted earlier, but this is controlled when we make detailed comparisons (e.g. between Figs. 1 and 2). For both the German and Japanese data, the oldest age group (80 years of age and over) should be regarded with special caution, as it covers a wide range of years and is more likely than younger age categories to include some people with serious physical or mental deficits.

TABLE 1
Most Frequently Mentioned Events and Changes:
German Sample

	<i>%1st Mention</i>	<i>%2nd Mention</i>	<i>%Mentions¹</i>
Reunification (1990)	26.6	24.0	50.7
World War II (1939–45)	32.1	5.6	37.8
Division of German (1945)	8.4	5.9	14.3
Gulf War (1990–91)	3.3	7.1	10.4
Economic Miracle begun (1948)	2.5	4.5	7.0
End of Cold War (1989)	3.3	3.2	6.5
Founding of FRG (1949)	3.6	2.3	5.9
European Community (1967)	2.5	1.5	4.0
Other	17.7	19.8	
No 2nd Mention	—	26.0	
N	100 (728)	100 (728)	

¹ Each row represents a dichotomy of those mentioning the event at all divided by the total number of respondents (728) mentioning at least one event.

urban–rural location controlled, using logistic regression with and without a quadratic term for age, and also multiple classification analysis (Andrews, Morgan, Sonquist, & Klem, 1973)—the former more appropriate given the dichotomised events, the latter convenient for studying non-linearity in detail. The two types of analysis yield essentially the same results, and neither education nor gender nor urban–rural location is generally related to mentioning a particular event.¹¹ As the association of age to mentioning an event is in no case changed importantly by controlling for education and gender in either the German or Japanese data (nor by urban–rural location in the German data), we will present the age relations graphically in the simple form of the percentage giving a particular event for each of our 13 age categories.

Figure 1 reports the cross-tabulation of %Mentions of World War II and Reunification by age. As expected, they show very clear reverse associations. Older people tend to choose World War II: using the mid-point (age 77) of the peak age range for the World War II curve, these respondents were 25 years old

¹¹ Education is related positively ($P < .05$) to mentioning the two more international events, End of the Cold War and Creation of the European Community, but not to the other events. This is quite different from what are more clearly semantic memories (knowledge about the world), where education is a major correlate in virtually all cases (Jennings, 1996; Schuman, Belli, & Bischooping, 1997). Gender is related to the mention of only one event: men are significantly more likely to mention the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Urban–rural location is significantly related to mentions of World War II (rural give slightly more mentions) and Division of Germany (urban give slightly more).




FIG. 1. World War II, Reunification, and the European Community for Germans.

when Germany began the war by invading Poland and were entering their thirties when the war ended. Younger people, especially 18 to 24 year olds, tend to mention Reunification, which had occurred officially in 1990, the year before the survey, and had been foreshadowed at the end of 1989 by the opening of the Berlin Wall. If we treat the peak for the older cohort as reliably established, despite the small number of cases (37), this extends the critical age period beyond the mid-twenties, and of course the peak for the younger cohort may be less than the 18 to 24 range that defines that end of our sample's age range. (The third event in Fig. 1, Europe, is discussed later.)

Of the remaining events in Table 1, both of the two most recent events—Gulf War and End of the Cold War—show significant relations in the same direction as Reunification, with disproportionate mentions by younger Germans. Two events from the early post-war years, the “Economic Miracle” (which is often dated from the 1948 currency reform but which extended for a decade or more) and the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (in 1949), both show non-significant trends to be mentioned more often by older Germans.

The last event listed in Table 1 reveals a curvilinear relation to age, as shown in Fig. 1: the European Community, which was initiated in 1957 as the EEC and then developed more fully in a political direction in 1967. The EC is mentioned disproportionately by Germans of around 40 years of age in 1991—cohorts that were in their late teens in the mid-sixties ($P < .06$ for the added quadratic term in a logistic regression with education, sex, and urban-rural location controlled). Here it would be helpful if we had a content analysis over time of mass media and perhaps school teaching to determine the date of maximum public attention on this event.

One other event in Table 1, Division of Germany, fails to show much sign of a relation to cohort, which seems odd as the division occurred at the end of World War II and therefore should have had its major impact on the older cohorts. However, Division is the complement of Reunification and therefore may well have been brought to mind for younger people by the salience of Reunification. We divided the sample into two parts: the Young (ages 18 to 54) and the Old (ages 55 and up), with the distinction the approximate point in Fig. 1 at which the two lines cross. We then found that 51% of those in the Young category who chose Division also gave Reunification as another response, whereas only 26% of those in the Old category who chose Division gave Reunification as well ($P < .02$ for the difference, Fisher's Exact Test). Thus, mention of Division of Germany is tied more closely to the salience of Reunification for younger Germans than for older Germans.

Much more dramatic than the official Reunification of Germany was the fall of the Berlin Wall a little more than a year prior to our survey. We coded separately any mention of the Wall, regardless of whether it occurred as part of another codable answer or not. We then distinguished between those who spoke only of the creation of the Wall ($n = 50$) and those who spoke only of its

destruction ($n=50$), omitting 17 cases where both were mentioned or the reference was ambiguous. For the 100 respondents where the reference was clear, the relation to age is highly significant ($\tau = -.25$, $P < .01$), and despite the small number of cases a distinct pattern is evident. Of those who were 40–49 in 1991 (which means ages 10 to 19 when the Wall was erected in 1961), 89% mention the building of the Wall and only 11% mention its fall. Of those aged 18–29 in 1991 and thus just a year younger when the Wall came down at the end of 1989, 73% mention its destruction and only 27% its creation. Respondents over age 50 are not distinctive in their mention of either creation (56%) or destruction (44%) of the Wall. These results provide further evidence of the specificity of the age at which a very dramatic event has its maximum impact on memory. The early peak for ages 10 to 19 for the building of the Wall fits a suggestion by Schuman and Scott (1989, pp.366–367) regarding memories of John Kennedy’s assassination and detailed evidence in Schuman and Corning (1997) that visually dramatic events are likely to imprint a younger age group than will equally important but more abstract events.

Personal Connections. Two-thirds (68%) of those 55 years of age and over gave a clearly personal reason when explaining their choice of World War II, e.g. “I lost my left arm there” “I always feared air-raid warnings”; “I lost my brother in the war”. Among those under age 55, the percentage giving a personal reason for having mentioned World War II (e.g. “Lost my grandfather”) is much lower, although still not trivial in proportion (24%).

However, the proportion of personal references (e.g. “Visits of relatives are possible again”) when explaining the importance of Reunification is much smaller—just 4%—which suggests that personal content may be less essential for making an event memorable if it is quite recent. There were no personal connections at all for mentions of the Gulf War, although some respondents did express anxieties about it developing into a larger conflict. Memories of recent dramatic public events can draw on current or recent media accounts. Early events are more likely to depend on personal experiences that have stayed alive for an individual and thus recur as memories with little or no external stimulation.

German Guilt. According to Buruma (1994), many Germans feel a great deal of guilt over the Nazi era generally and over the annihilation of the Jews in particular. However, words clearly connoting guilt over the Nazi period were seldom apparent in these responses. Some respondents did refer to Hitler as crazy or were otherwise condemnatory of that time (5% of the sample, and showing no relation to age), but as this did not involve personal statements of responsibility, it could be seen more as a way of distancing oneself from the Nazi era than as a sign of personal guilt. Moreover, as Koonz (1994, p.261) emphasises, “Germans generally had not suffered under Nazi rule until the tides

of war turned'', so those who lived through that period as adults had little personal reason to be critical, whatever their post-war leaders may have told them about Nazi crimes.

Only 7 of the 728 German respondents mentioned Jews at any point in their answers, usually by referring to their annihilation (''Judenvernichtung'') during the Nazi era. Against the possibility that our questions may have somehow failed to tap the importance of this particular memory, we note that 17 respondents mentioned the first landing on the moon as important—not a recent event, nor one closer in personal terms than the destruction of the Jews.¹²

If we divide the small number who do mention the killing of Jews by our Young (18–54) and Old (55 and up) categories, all seven of the respondents come from the Young age group ($P = .05$ by Fisher's Exact Test). Germans under 55 at the time of our survey were less than 10 years old in 1945 and in most cases not even born at that point. This fits other accounts that indicate that strong regret among Germans tends, when it occurs, to characterise those too young to have had any direct involvement in the Nazi period, much more than those who actually lived through the period themselves and of course in some cases may have participated to one degree or another in it (Browning, 1992). Older adults were much more likely to dwell in their memories on their own suffering under bombing, shortages of food, and enemy occupation, rather than on the suffering of others, especially others whose fate might add the pain of guilt to that of defeat.¹³

Thus, with regard to World War II, our questions appeared to stimulate memories of autobiographical experience, whereas much of the post-war emphasis on Nazi crimes has involved a kind of learning that creates semantic memories. A concern with Nazi crimes became a matter of public discussion only in the 1960s, first at a more intellectual level, including debates among historians about the nature and uniqueness of the 'Final Solution' (Miller, 1990). Still later there was wider popular involvement, in part because of the made-for-television series called *Holocaust*, which allowed easy identification with stock figures from the past. According to Buruma (1994, p.88), when it was shown in 1979 the series was seen by half the adult population of West Germany. He quotes an article by Heinz Hoehne in *Der Spiegel*:

An American television series, made in a trivial style, produced more for commercial than for moral reasons, more for entertainment than for enlightenment,

¹² Heinrich (1996) used the same Schuman and Scott (1989) open-ended event question in a self-administered survey in 1995 and reports that 10% of West Germans mentioned Jews. This may be partly because his translation of the follow-up 'why' question was somewhat better, but even more likely because his open question was preceded by a closed question concerning responsibility for dealing with the annihilation of Jews. Moreover, even if the true figure is somewhere between 1% and 10%, it would still be quite small.

¹³ There is no sign of a relation between mentions of Jews and either education or sex.

accomplished what hundreds of books, plays, films, and television programs, thousands of documents, and all the concentration camp trials have failed to do in the more than three decades since the end of the war: to inform Germans about crimes against Jews committed in their name, so that millions were emotionally touched and moved.

Yet without questioning the immediate emotional power of such a film, it is doubtful that a vicarious experience of this kind can have a deep and lasting impact on memory for a larger public. It is possible for individuals in all countries to emerge from a darkened theatre with tears in their eyes, yet within a few hours or days to have largely forgotten the experience in a way that would not have happened if their tears had flowed out of direct involvement in a real-life event.

Unlike World War II, recent events such as Reunification and the Gulf War do seem to have been mentioned frequently on the basis of semantic memories, as indicated by the finding that they seldom produced explanations that involved personal experience. This leads again to the hypothesis that mention of recent public events (as well as memories of early events by current cohorts) are usually less dependent on episodic memory. Of course, where recent events do involve important personal experience, this should serve to sustain the memory of the event in future years.

Collective Memories in Yokohama, Japan, in 1991

Events that were mentioned by more than 3% of Yokohama respondents are presented in Table 2. World War II was by far the most frequent, given by well over half the Yokohama respondents, although certainly not all.¹⁴ The Gulf War, which had occurred just a few months before the survey began, was a distant second for the Japanese. Third were references to the Imperial System. German Reunification, which included mentions of the fall of the

¹⁴ Japanese respondents mentioning what Americans and Europeans call World War II sometimes referred to it as the "Greater East Asian War" or the "Pacific War". Buruma (1944, p.47) states that the "Greater East Asian War" is associated with the idea that prior to 1941 "Japan was fighting a war to liberate Asia from Bolshevism and white colonialism", and he implies that people who employ the term still hold to this belief. He also claims that "...only Japanese of a liberal disposition call World War II the Pacific War". Of the 529 responses coded as mentioning World War II, 58 referred to it as the "Greater East Asian War", and these people were largely (and significantly) the oldest in our sample—all but three were born before 1941. However, it is not clear that this usage has a continuing political significance, for the content of their responses is mostly about suffering during World War II, just as are the responses that use the term World War II. Not a single one contained political content of the type suggested by Buruma or referred to pre-1941 conflicts. References to the "Pacific War" are not distinctive in age at all, nor does their usage include obvious political views of any kind. Thus we have no evidence for the political connotations of the terms employed to refer to the war, although we are limited in the degree to which we are able to explore this issue with our data.

Berlin Wall in 1989, came next, followed by the 1973 Arab boycott of oil (known in Japan as “the Oil Shock”), and finally a category impossible to date with any precision, Environmental issues.¹⁵ When the Yokohama percentages are adjusted to reflect the country-wide age distribution (the last column in Table 2), the percentage mentioning World War II goes down by about 10% and all other responses go up by 1% to 3%, which decreases the gap between the most remembered event and all others, but does not change basic conclusions.

The proportions of first versus second mentions for most events are not very different, except that when World War II is mentioned it is almost always given first, testifying further to its importance in the minds of those who give it at all. In the United States, a larger proportion of World War II responses, a quarter, were given as second mentions (Schuman & Scott, 1989). Even after adjusting

TABLE 2
Most Frequently Mentioned Events and Changes:
Japanese Sample

	%1st Mention	%2nd Mention	%Mentions ¹	Weighted ²
World War II (1941–45)	60.3	2.5	62.8%	53.1%
Gulf War (1990–91)	8.1	5.4	13.5%	16.4%
Emperor (1989)	5.0	3.9	8.9%	10.2%
German Unity (1990)	4.7	3.1	7.8%	10.2%
Oil Shock (1973)	2.4	1.5	3.9%	5.1%
Environmental	1.5	1.9	3.4%	4.5%
Other	18.0	27.0		
No 2nd Mention	—	54.7		
	100	100		
N	(843)	(843)		

¹ Each row represents a dichotomy of those mentioning the event at all divided by the total number of respondents (843) mentioning at least one event.

² Percentages of %Mentioning an event reweighted to reflect the age distribution in the Japanese population based on the 1990 census. Source: *Nippon: A charted survey of Japan, 1994*, published by Kokusei-sha, Tokyo, 1995. The original age data come from the Bureau of Statistics, Management and Coordination Agency.

¹⁵ The next three events in order would be Economic Prosperity, mentioned by 2.9%, End of the Cold War (2.6%), and the Sales Tax of 1989 (2.5%). Japanese in 1991 might well have been as impressed with Japan’s post-war economic prosperity as were the Germans with their own, but the Japanese proportion is significantly smaller ($P < .01$) and there also seems to be less of a single term like “economic miracle” in Japan to characterise its remarkable economic development. On the other hand, the Japanese emphasis on the 1973 oil crisis is not matched in the German sample, where only 2 out of the 728 respondents mentioned that event, even though Germans were also greatly affected by the 1973 Arab boycott.

the Yokohama percentages to fit the country-wide age distribution, the 53% who mention World War II is considerably higher than the equivalent percentage in the United States in 1985, which was 29%. Important as the war was to Americans, civilians were never bombed, the country occupied, or the polity transformed after the war.¹⁶

The associations of age with mentions of World War II, the Gulf War, and the Oil Crisis are shown in Fig. 2.¹⁷ The relation of World War II mentions to age is particularly striking: approximately 90% of those in their 70s mention the war either 1st or 2nd in importance, with the percentage declining to less than 30% among those under 40 years of age. The results indicate the continuing salience of World War II in the collective memories of older Japanese, while the sharp decline in mentions once past the World War II cohorts indicates the diminishment of such collective memories as new cohorts replace the remnants of the World War II generation.

The other two events shown in Fig. 2 also reveal clear and readily interpreted age relations. The Gulf War, having just ended, is given primarily by the younger people in the sample, and rarely by those over 50.¹⁸ Indeed, it is reported almost as frequently by those under 45 (born after 1945) as is World War II. It should be emphasised that the age relations for the two wars were neither created nor constrained by the original question wording. The question never refers to “memories”, but simply to mentioning important events or changes, and thus World War II was completely within the scope of the question regardless of a respondent’s age—as available in principle to those aged 18 as to those aged 80. Yet despite the overwhelming significance of World War II to Japan’s subsequent history, fewer than half of Japanese under 40 years of age mention it as an especially important event.

The third event shown in Fig. 2 is the only one from Table 2 that is neither early nor recent in time: the 1973 “Oil Shock”. It reveals almost precisely the age relation we would expect, based on the assumption that an event has its largest impact on those who experience it during their youth. The “Oil Shock” is mentioned primarily by those around 42 years of age, which implies age 24 at

¹⁶ Scott and Zac (1993) report that 45% of Britons mentioned World War II, although that sample also has limitations that make generalisation to the entire population a little uncertain. Britain was heavily bombed, but not to the same extent as Japan, and it faced the threat of invasion but not the actuality, hence the British figure falling between the Japanese and American values seems plausible. However, all of these figures no doubt depend on the salience of competing events, such as Reunification for Germans, so comparisons across countries are more useful within age categories, as we do at a later point (Fig. 4), and even then must be considered in the context of other events.

¹⁷ Graphs of Unification and Environment are much like those for the Gulf War, except that the Environment also shows a weak curvilinearity similar to the Oil Crisis (discussed later). The relation of age to mentions of the Emperor is presented in Fig. 3.

¹⁸ Although the logistic regression yields a significant quadratic term ($P < .03$), it is slight and less visible than the highly significant ($P < .0001$) and very visible linear trend.




FIG. 2. World War II, the Gulf War, and the Oil Crisis, by age for Japanese.

the time the Arab states suddenly and drastically reduced the flow of oil to the West and Japan. Japan is almost totally dependent on imports for oil, and thus the boycott made a lasting impression on many Japanese in their teens and twenties at the time—more so than on older Japanese—as reflected in the curvilinear relation in Fig. 2.

Figure 3 presents the one event about which we were initially uncertain: responses concerning the Imperial System. To the extent that this is a traditional aspect of Japanese society, one might have expected it to be mentioned most often by older Japanese, the more so because the baseline data we used in our question referred explicitly to the beginning of Emperor Hirohito's reign in 1926. However, the late Emperor's lengthy terminal illness in 1988 and the ascension to the throne of Emperor Akihito took place less than two years prior to our survey and thus constituted a very recent event, occurring indeed in the same year as the fall of the Berlin Wall.¹⁹ Figure 3 indicates that it was recency rather than tradition that led to most of the memories reported by the Yokohama sample, for the relation is inversely and significantly related to age.²⁰ Thus the changes in the Imperial System had most impact on younger Japanese, much as did recent international events such as German Reunification and the Gulf War. Moreover, even among older respondents, not a single answer speaks of the 1926 enthronement of Hirohito or of the early years of his reign; most of the responses refer to Emperor Hirohito's death or to the transition from his era to the new one ("the change from Showa to Heisei" was a frequent response).

The Content of World War II Mentions. As would be expected, age was strongly related to whether mentions of World War II included some reference to personal or family involvement in the war, e.g. "I was in the bombing and faced death directly". Younger people who referred to the war tended to speak in more general ways about its positive outcomes, such as peace, democracy, or prosperity.

¹⁹ Emperor Hirohito succumbed over an extended period of time—collapsing on 19 September, 1988, but not dying until 7 January, 1989—and the media reported every day on his condition, presenting many medical details that would not ordinarily be published in the West (Field, 1991). According to Field (1991, p.ix), the period was "lived with a particular intensity by most Japanese", and with much concern throughout the nation over how to avoid ordinary business and social activities that might seem disrespectful.

²⁰ There is a hint of curvilinearity, with an apparent peak of mentions among those 30 to 34, but the trend does not approach statistical significance, is difficult to interpret, and must be regarded as indistinguishable in this sample from chance variation. However, we should note that the more literal cohort effect inferred from Mannheim's emphasis on adolescence and early adulthood is less apparent here, with the peak mentions a little older (30–34) than expected, although the number of cases on which that point is based is quite small ($n = 37$).




FIG. 3. Mentions of Imperial System, by age for Japanese. (Base Ns are same as Fig. 2.)

Hiroshima as a Symbol of the War. As noted earlier, Buruma (1994) claims that Hiroshima is “the supreme symbol of the Pacific War” for the Japanese. We counted the number of mentions of Hiroshima by anyone in the sample, including those who did not use the name of the city (or of Nagasaki) but simply referred to the dropping of an atomic bomb. Only 20 respondents referred in any way to Hiroshima, and this includes two somewhat ambiguous cases. Thus only about 2% of the Yokohama sample mentioned the dropping of an atomic bomb on Japan, and the percentage rises to only 3.7% when we limit the base to the 529 respondents who mentioned World War II in any way at all.

Much of Japan (including Yokohama) was very heavily bombed during World War II, and by 1945 “60 percent of the ground area of the country’s sixty larger cities and towns had been burnt out” (Keegan, 1990, p.577). Thus it is not surprising that the many references to suffering during World War II would be based on personal experience of bombing in a particular locality such as Yokohama, not on the symbolic significance of Hiroshima. In this case it is important to distinguish between those who attempt to represent public views and the larger public that is being represented. (It did seem likely that respondents who mentioned Hiroshima would be younger Japanese; those whose view of the war must be based increasingly on various forms of continuing public emphasis, rather than on personal experience. However, the small number of respondents who mention Hiroshima are not distinctive in age, unlike Germans who mention the destruction of Jews, nor in education or gender.)

The Legacy of Defeat. In coding World War II mentions, we noted specific references to Japan having been defeated in the war in 15% of the responses. This is a much higher rate than for Germans, where mentions of defeat occur in less than 2% of World War II responses. The Japanese–German difference is highly significant ($P < .001$).

The relation of Japanese references to defeat and age is weakly and nearly significantly ($P = .06$) curvilinear: defeat is mentioned more often by those 18 to 34 and also by those 55 and over. This can be seen as consistent with Buruma’s (1994) suggestion that a realistic account of the war, including its causes and outcomes, tends to be located among the very old and the very young—the old because they were born before the height of chauvinistic propaganda and the young because they were born after it had passed. It is difficult to test this idea more definitively, but what is even clearer in our data is the finding that defeat is referred to increasingly as the education of respondents rises (with age controlled): 8%, 8%, 14%, 15%, 25%, and 24%, respectively, as one moves from those with only elementary school education to those who have a college degree or more years of schooling. (German mentions of defeat are too few to show relations to age or education.)

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT GERMAN AND JAPANESE COLLECTIVE MEMORIES

Where external events occurred that should have had similar impacts on German and Japanese lives, previous tables and figures suggest quite similar effects in terms of salient memories of what were important national and world happenings over the past half-century. Figure 4 brings together two such events for closer examination. Each country felt the enormous impact of World War II, including towards its end the constant bombing of cities and the aftermath of widespread fear and suffering. Forty-five years later, each country took the role of distant observers of the Gulf War, pressed to help the US effort but not becoming directly involved as combatants. Figure 4 shows quite similar memory curves by age for these two events in the two countries, with World War II mentioned especially by older people and the Gulf War by those in their youth.

Mentions of World War II display an interesting non-linear structure, although more clearly for Japanese than for Germans (where the percentages are less reliable because of smaller base *N*s). The graph can be seen as having two main plateaus, joined by a steep incline in the mid-age range and with a dip for the oldest members of the sample. The war had ended some 45 years earlier and the low plateau for younger people consists essentially of all those who were born after 1945 or were very young children at that time—thus they did not have direct experience of the war itself and in most cases fail to mention it as especially important. A steep rise then occurs as cohorts are included that progressed through childhood and early adolescence during the war years. Next, the high plateau for older people consists of respondents who were all young adults during World War II. Finally, the dip for those 80 and over fits the Mannheim hypothesis that these oldest people, who were already beyond their late 20s when World War II started in 1939, should be a little less affected by the war experience; however, the number in this oldest age category ($N=41$) is small and they may also present special problems of memory loss.

To the extent that there is anything further to explain about country differences in Fig. 4, it has to do mainly with the somewhat higher percentages of World War II memories for older Japanese than for older Germans, although the levels are much the same for youth in the two countries. It is likely that the lower percentage by older Germans is due to the competing salience of memories of the recent reunification. The logic of our question, which called for mentioning two important events, did not make World War II and Division or Reunification mutually exclusive, but they may have tended to be mutually exclusive in the memories of German respondents.

Of course, even where levels of mentions of the same event are quite similar by Germans and Japanese, this does not necessarily point to identical motivations. In the case of the Gulf War, although objections to war as such was the most frequent reason given in both countries, Germans more often




FIG. 4. World War II and Gulf War mentions by Germans and Japanese, by age. (Base Ns are same as Fig. 1 for Germans and Fig. 2 for Japanese.)

expressed possible anxiety about the enlargement of the war to include Germany (28%), perhaps fitting their closer proximity to the Gulf, as against the parallel response (7%) for Japanese. On the other hand, Japanese more often cited the possible effects of the Gulf War on oil prices (12%) than did Germans (4%), consistent with the more frequent Japanese mentions of the 1973 oil crisis. It is also interesting to note that five Germans likened Iraq's Hussein to Hitler; no Japanese drew any similar parallel.

Our data on the reasons people give for mentioning an event are also valuable in pointing up the relation to time of the distinction between episodic and semantic memories. World War II differs from most later events in the high degree to which memories concerning it are autobiographical rather than a matter of abstract learning about the past. Such personally experienced early events can emerge from memory with little or no help from external stimuli, whereas many recent events like the Gulf War are likely to be remembered mainly because of their salience in the media. This suggests the hypothesis that recent events that are not directly experiential will show less sharp cohort effects than earlier events, because the nearly universal exposure to the mass media will be the primary causal factor, not the earlier deeper encoding that is connected to the self (Conway, 1997). Figure 4 provides some preliminary evidence: for Germans the absolute value of the linear slope for World War II is more than twice as great as that for the Gulf War, and for Japanese the ratio is more than three to one. Thus, distinct cohort effects are greater for the earlier than for the more recent event.

We are not suggesting that recent events cannot be every bit as personally meaningful and therefore as likely to yield autobiographical memories as earlier events. In 1945, World War II, then a "recent" event, would doubtless have produced many episodic memories. What we are suggesting is that for events *not* personally important in an autobiographical sense, recency will tend to be a necessary factor in having them brought to mind in response to a general inquiry like our Events questions. It is striking that even an event as "objectively" significant as World War II was mentioned as especially important by only about a quarter of youth from the two countries.

When we turn to events less frequently mentioned than World War II and the Gulf War, there are two cohort effects that are of particular theoretical importance because of their curvilinearity: The European Community for Germans (see Fig. 1) and the 1973 oil crisis for Japanese (see Fig. 2). The relatively low mention of these events by very young people (e.g. Japanese under age 30 in 1991) can readily be attributed to the fact that they were too young to have been aware of such events when they occurred. However, lack of mention by older people (e.g. Japanese age 60 and above in 1991, although nearly 20 years younger in 1973) cannot be explained by their unawareness of the event at the time it occurred. Thus these results provide further evidence for the unique importance of adolescence and early adulthood as a period during

which collective memories of public events tend to be imprinted. At the same time, we need to extend the critical age range for collective memories in both directions: to include later childhood for events that are simple and dramatic, such as the building of the Berlin Wall, and to include the late twenties or even early thirties for events that are more abstract and complex.

There are also several small but apparently reliable differences between our German and Japanese results that are intriguing because they suggest subtle variations in the way the two countries experienced what was broadly the same event. These between-country differences raise again the issue discussed at the beginning of this article: the relation between “collective memory”, as promulgated by interested elites and organisations, and the collective memories of ordinary individuals.

First, we noted the higher proportion of mentions of an “economic miracle” or its equivalent by Germans than by Japanese, even though both countries recovered in a relatively short time from World War II devastation to become major economic powers on the world scene. Our tentative explanation is that the German economic development, beginning with the 1948 currency reform, was more rapid and dramatic, at least partly due to the benefits that flowed from the Marshall Plan, and that this was especially true in terms of the impact of development on per capita consumption, which remained much lower in post-war Japan than in West Germany.²¹ In addition, this may also be a case where a collective memory embedded in the language in the form of the term “economic miracle” (*Wirtschaftswunder*) has continued to make the early economic recovery more accessible to individual German memories in later years and thus affected responses to our Events questions (cf. Schudson, 1992), with even the internal alliteration of the German term an aid to its use and memory (cf. Rubin, 1995).

Second, the Japanese were much more likely than the Germans to mention the 1973 oil crisis, although both countries relied heavily on imported oil at that point in time. However, “of all the industrial countries, [Japan] was the one most dependent on oil as a source of total energy” (Yergin, 1991, p.628), and there were realistic differences in the degree to which the two countries were being harmed by the embargo and the sharp escalation in oil prices. In addition, ordinary Japanese may have been affected by this evident fulfilment of earlier elite pronouncements about their country’s lack of natural resources and its

²¹ On Japan’s lag in per capita consumption, as compared to its more rapid pace in per capita gross domestic product (GDP), see Denison and Chung (1976). On the effect of the Marshall Plan, see the comment by West Germany’s former Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt (1997). Unfortunately it has proven difficult to locate more direct evidence based on a close comparison of German and Japanese post-war economic development. There are many separate studies of each country by economic historians, but apparently no close comparison of the two. We should acknowledge that on this point, as well as on the two points that follow, our interpretations remain more speculative than we would prefer.

extreme vulnerability to any cut-off of imports—the pronouncements creating a kind of permanent collective memory waiting to be actuated. Indeed, the panic in Japan resulting from the oil crisis spread to a variety of other products, leading to widespread hoarding and to shortages not directly related to oil (Tsuchiya, 1986; Yergin, 1991, p.616).

Third, Japanese refer to the defeat of their country in World War II more often than Germans refer to their defeat. It is difficult from a Western standpoint to see the complete loss of the war by the two countries to have been very different, although Germany's situation was not as unique, as it had been defeated in World War I just a quarter of a century earlier. But the more frequent mentions of defeat by Japanese may be an example of how the formal public expression of a collective memory through societal commemoration helps shape individual memories (cf. Schwartz, 1997). 15 August, the day Japan surrendered in 1945, is celebrated annually as a way of honouring those Japanese killed in the war and it has become known in some quarters in Japan as the “Anniversary of Defeat”. Nothing equivalent occurs in Germany either on an annual basis or with that reference.

Finally, when we turn again to consider memories of crucial happenings within the World War II period, the limitations of an elite-sponsored collective memory in the face of powerful autobiographical memories become clear for both countries, albeit for two quite different events. To the naive outside observer, especially someone who thinks of collective memory in terms of important political symbols, there might well be the anticipation of hearing frequently the word “Holocaust” or its equivalent mentioned by Germans, and “Hiroshima” or its equivalent by Japanese. Yet there are few such mentions in the two samples: only 7 out of 728 Germans refer in any way to Jews and only 20 out of 843 Japanese refer to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or the atomic bomb. At the same time, in each country large numbers do talk about World War II and especially about the negative consequences it had for themselves and their families. If we had only the German result, we might be tempted to speculate on how difficult it is to report memories that characterise one's nation as victimiser. However, our Japanese sample seldom mentioned Hiroshima, despite the fact that the term identifies them as victims, not as victimisers. When we take the two findings together—the paucity of references *either* to the Holocaust or to Hiroshima—we can connect both results to a pervasive finding of cross-section surveys around the world: ordinary individuals (“the general public”) are usually much more concerned with the impact of events on their own personal lives than they are with the events and symbols that occupy much of the attention of intellectuals, political leaders, and academic investigators.²²

²² In the long run, elite-sponsored collective memories may nevertheless win out, once the generations having even distant connection to World War II have disappeared completely, though by that point none of the memories may carry much meaning for ordinary people.

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APPENDIX

German Question Wording:

In den letzten 50 Jahren, also seit etwa 1940, hat es eine Reihe nationaler und internationaler Veränderungen gegeben. Könnten Sie mir bitte ein oder zwei dieser Ereignisse oder Veränderungen nennen, die Ihnen besonders wichtig erschienen sind. Auf diese Frage gibt es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten, es geht uns ganz besonders darum, zu erfahren, welche wichtigen nationalen oder internationalen Ereignisse Ihnen in den Sinn kommen.

Was macht das Ereignis besonders wichtig für Sie?

Gab es in dieser Zeit irgendein anderes nationales oder internationales Ereignis oder eine Veränderung, die für Sie besonders wichtig war?

Und was macht dieses Ereignis besonders wichtig für Sie?

Japanese Question Wording:

Q 26(1) 昭和のはじめから今日までに、日本でも世界でも、いろいろな出来事や変化がありました。その中で、あなたにとって特に重要と思われる国内や世界の出来事や変化を1つか2つあげてください。あなたにとって重要なものであれば、どんなことでも結構です

(a) 重要な出来事(1番目)

(記入欄)

(b) 重要な出来事(2番目)

(記入欄)

(2) 今あげてもらったその出来事を特に重要と思われた理由は何ですか

(a) 重要な出来事(1番目)をあげた理由

(記入欄)

(b) 重要な出来事(2番目)をあげた理由

(記入欄)